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To better understand human behavior, econ-
omists have enriched the private utility maxi-
mization model with altruism and prosociality, 
reciprocity and fairness, identity, and values (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Benabou and Tirole 
2003; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Fehr and Schmidt 
1999; Rabin 1993; Tabellini 2008). These factors 
are incorporated into preferences and, whilst they 
can vary across generations as parents transmit 
values to their children (Bisin and Verdier 2000; 
Tabellini 2008), they are fixed for any given 
individual.
This is in sharp contrast with studies in ethics 
and moral philosophy that are concerned with 
the process through which virtues develop. A key 
mechanism is that virtue is an asset that grows 
through righteous acts, as argued in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. We formalize this idea by 
introducing altruistic capital, defined as an asset 
that enables individuals to internalize the effect 
of their actions on others. In contrast to altruis-
tic preferences, that are fixed, altruistic capital 
can be accumulated or depleted over time within 
the same individual, and affected by policy. Our 
key assumption, which follows directly from 
Aristotle’s intuition, is that individuals accumu-
late altruistic  capital by doing altruistic acts. In 
this framework,  policies that encourage altruistic 
behavior in the short run facilitate altruism in the 
long run and agents’ altruistic behavior depends 
both on their innate preferences as well as the 
extent to which they operate in a context that 
encourages the accumulation of altruistic capital.
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We illustrate our ideas in an industry that is 
perceived to be highly selfish: banking. Two 
observations motivate us. First, bankers affect 
social welfare through many channels, most 
importantly by allocating credit to productive 
rather than predatory or speculatory activities. 
Recent events have demonstrated that getting 
this balance wrong can have profoundly nega-
tive consequences on society. Second, the pol-
icy implications of the fixed preferences and 
the altruistic capital model differ substantially. 
Indeed if preferences are fixed, the only way 
aggregate altruism can change within an orga-
nization or industry is by attracting individuals 
with different preferences. In contrast, altruistic 
capital can be accumulated and shaped by policy.
We collaborate with a global bank to pro-
vide evidence on two of the building blocks of 
the altruistic capital model. We collect data on 
employees’ perceived returns to altruistic acts (not their altruistic preferences) using a survey 
that covers just under 10,000 employees across 
50+ countries. We find that (i) returns vary sub-
stantially across countries and across job types; (ii) higher returns are associated with effort 
devoted to the prevention of financial crime—a 
high social impact activity—as well as better 
performance on their main task and their atti-
tudes toward cooperation with others inside and 
outside the bank; and (iii) returns are lowest in 
countries where the financial crisis hit the hardest. 
Given that this is correlated with performance, 
the crisis might have triggered a vicious circle 
from low perceived returns to altruistic effort to 
lower effort to lower altruistic capital and hence 
even lower effort. These results suggest that pol-
icies that raise the returns to altruistic acts can 
promote the accumulation of altruistic capital.
I. Framework
An individual is hired to perform a job that 
comprises both private and altruistic tasks. To 
illustrate in our banking context, loan officers 
are tasked to sell financial products and to screen 
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clients for potential involvement in socially 
harmful activities, such as prostitution rings, 
money laundering, or terrorism. The first is a 
private task that brings revenues to the bank, the 
second is an altruistic task that affects the wel-
fare of others in society. Agent  i in every period 
t , chooses how much effort to devote to selfish 
s and altruistic  a tasks. Selfish tasks generate 
profits for the organization and yield a monetary 
payoff for the agent  Y = ms while altruistic acts 
generate social welfare according to the function 
W . The weight the agent puts on  W depends on 
her social preferences  σ i and on the reward  θ t 
that the organization or society attaches to  W. 
As is standard in the literature, the preference 
parameter  σ i is individual specific, exogenous, 
and captures both pure altruism and warm glow. θ t , in contrast, is common to all individuals in 
the same organization and can be manipulated 
by policy. Organizations might care about social 
welfare by design or as a response to regulation. 
Banks, for instance, can be fined if found to 
serve clients engaged in crime and, because of 
this, might want to incentivize their loan officers 
to be watchful.
Agent  i ’s utility at time  t equals 
 Y it + ( σ i +  θ t )  W it − d( s t ,  a t ) where  d( · ) is the 
disutility of work. The social welfare produced 
by agent  i at time  t is an increasing function of 
the effort she devotes to altruistic tasks  a it and 
her stock of altruistic capital  A it :  W( a it ,  A it ). 
Following Solow (1995) and Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2010) we use the term “capital” 
to describe a durable factor that (i) can be mea-
sured; (ii) requires costly actions in the present 
to produce benefits in the future; and (iii) has a 
precise mechanism through which it is accumu-
lated and depleted.
Starting with the latter, we assume that altru-
istic capital grows proportionally to the effort 
devoted to altruistic tasks as virtue in Aristotle’s 
quote. Following Lucas’ (1988) model of human 
capital accumulation, we assume that a share  u 
of the effort devoted to altruistic tasks increases 
social welfare directly in the period it is exerted 
while the remaining  1 − u increases altruistic 
capital in the next period. The accumulation of 
altruistic capital is therefore not deliberate, but 
rather a by-product of altruistic acts. This cap-
tures Aristotle’s idea that righteous acts build 
“virtue.” Altruistic capital in period  t can then 
be measured as  A t = (1 − u )  a t−1 + (1 − δ)  A t−1 
where  δ is the depreciation rate, as  altruistic 
 capital—like any other form of capital—
becomes obsolete.
We model the payoff of altruistic capital 
as a boost to the production of social welfare 
W aA > 0, that is altruistic capital increases the 
marginal product of altruistic effort. This cap-
tures the idea that altruistic capital facilitates 
altruistic acts because, for instance, agents learn 
how to spot opportunities to help others, or, in 
a model with limited attention, makes altruistic 
acts more salient. Intuitively, individuals who 
have been performing several altruistic acts in 
the past require less effort to obtain the same 
result.1 Accumulating  A is costly either in terms 
of forgone leisure or forgone monetary gains. 
While this depends on the exact context, the key 
feature is that, akin to investments in physical 
and human capital, costs are incurred at time  t 
while (a share  1 − u of) benefits materialize in 
the future.
The marginal return to altruistic acts ( (  σ i +  θ t )  W a (u  a it ,  A it ) −  d a ( s it ,  a it ) ) thus can 
be increased by changing  θ t , the reward given 
for altruism, or the slope of the “production 
function”  W a , for example by providing evi-
dence on how the effort of agent  i affects  W. A 
key feature of this model is that, since  W aA > 0, 
the reward needed to incentivize a given level of 
altruistic effort is decreasing in the level of altru-
istic capital. Thus, an organization only needs to 
provide strong incentives (high  θ) until  A is suf-
ficiently high.
II. Measuring the Returns to Altruism
The framework has two building blocks: (i) 
that returns to altruistic effort, and hence the 
choice to put forth effort, depend on context 
specific factors that can be shaped by policy and 
exogenous events, (ii) that altruistic effort today 
leads to the accumulation of altruistic capital 
that increases the returns to altruistic effort in 
the future. We now show evidence on (i) and 
briefly discuss (ii) in the conclusion.
1 Alternatively one could assume that the cost of devoting 
effort to altruistic tasks is decreasing in  A ; these two formu-
lations are equivalent. 
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A. Data
We collect measures of  θ and  W a through a 
survey that our partner bank administers every 
month to 10 percent of their employees globally; 
of these, about 35 percent respond. The sample 
is stratified by country and job function (e.g., 
retail banking, human resources), which allows 
us to assess whether individuals in different con-
texts face different returns to altruistic effort. We 
use the survey administered in October 2016, 
to which we added two questions on perceived 
social impact and social worth (Grant 2008) 
that proxy  W a (the effect that bankers have on 
society) and  θ (society’s appreciation of bank-
ers’ impact), respectively.2 Both measures range 
from 1 to 5 and their sample average (SD) are 
3.88 (0.72) and 3.54 (0.88). Their correlation is 
0.62.
B. Variation Across Jobs and Countries
We find that the perceived returns to altruistic 
effort are weakly correlated with demographics 
that might shape preferences (gender, age, and 
tenure) and pay band, but are strongly correlated 
with job type (e.g., finance, HR, private bank-
ing) and country. Figure 1 reports these strong 
correlations. To improve readability, the figure is 
rescaled by subtracting the group that has lowest 
returns. Panel A shows that perceived returns are, 
predictably, highest for corporate sustainability, 
while they are lower for  back-office functions 
such as the legal and marketing offices.
Panel B shows very large differences across 
countries: in general, both measures are lower 
in higher income countries, which is where 
the hit of the financial crisis was more severe 
and where there was a significant drop of pub-
lic trust in bankers (Stevenson and Wolfers 
2011). Figure 2 plots the average social impact 
2 Perceived social impact is measured with three state-
ments: “I feel that my work makes a positive difference in 
other people’s lives,” “I am very aware of the ways in which 
my work is benefiting others,” and “I am very conscious of 
the positive impact that my work has on others.” Perceived 
social worth is measured with three statements: “I feel that 
other people in society appreciate my work,” “I feel that 
other people in society value my contributions at work,” 
and “I feel that other people in society respect me for my 
work.” In both cases, the three statements are answered on a 
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 5 being 
“strongly agree,” and the answers are then averaged. 
(worth) conditional on demographics and job 
traits against the change in unemployment rates 
around the crisis (2007 to 2009), as well as the 
line of best fit estimated at the country level. 
Averages are weighted by the employee pop-
ulation in that country. The evidence suggests 
that perceived social impact, that is the bankers’ 
own assessment of whether their actions affect 
others, is not correlated with the severity of the 
crisis. This is consistent with the fact that the job 
has remained essentially the same. In contrast, 
perceived social worth is much lower in coun-
tries that took a hard hit.
C. Correlation with Altruistic Acts and 
Performance
The core question is whether higher returns 
make bankers devote more effort to altruistic 
tasks. In the absence of an exogenous source 
of variation that can be used to identify causal 
impacts, we present descriptive evidence on the 
correlation between our measures of returns and 
proxies for effort devoted to altruistic tasks and 
to their main task. Because the nature of pro-
social tasks differs depending on the exact job 
description, we split employees into those who 
provide banking services to clients directly and 
those in support functions and back office. For 
the former, one of the main drivers of social 
impact is allocating credit to its most productive 
use rather than to agents engaged in illegal activ-
ities. We measure the effort devoted to screen-
ing clients by the response to the question on 
engagement with the “due diligence” process, 
namely the effort devoted to screening clients 
for financial crime. To avoid surveyor demand 
effects on this relatively sensitive question, the 
question is asked about the office in general and 
is a more accurate reflection of individual beliefs 
and effort. In addition, for both groups we 
merged the survey data with personnel records 
of their supervisors’ assessment of whether the 
employee has “good values” such as integrity, 
cooperation, and connection with the customer. 
To measure effort devoted to regular tasks we 
use the supervisors’ assessment of their perfor-
mance relative to expectations for that role. Both 
the values and performance measures are those 
used to determine the annual bonuses.
Table 1 shows OLS regressions that control 
for the correlates of returns discussed in Section 
IIB. We find that returns to altruistic effort are 
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correlated with effort. The largest correlations 
are with client screening, that is the measure 
that is most closely related to social impact: a 
one standard deviation increase in perceived 
social impact (social worth) is correlated with 
a quarter (14 percent) of a standard  deviation 
increase in engagement in screening clients for 
financial crime. The findings are thus consistent 
with the idea that higher returns to altruistic 
effort are associated with more effort devoted 
to altruistic tasks and that this does not come at 
the expense of the main task.
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Figure 1. Returns by Job Type and Country
Note: Panel B is restricted to the 37 (out of 58) countries with more than 30 observations and multiple international banks.
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Table 1—Correlations between Performance and the Returns to Altruistic Capital
Employee type Frontline Back office
LHS 
Client 
screening Values Performance Values Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social impact 0.268 0.0615 0.0670 0.0354 0.0511
(0.0291) (0.0302) (0.0270) (0.0137) (0.0157)
Social worth 0.126 −0.0129 0.0407 0.0156 0.00213
(0.0346) (0.0113) (0.0198) (0.00768) (0.0104)
Observations 2,827 2,436 2,653 5,962 6,217
SD of LHS 0.775 0.509 0.802 0.454 0.785
R2 0.180 0.094 0.096 0.067 0.089
Notes: Data is at the individual level, and standard errors are clustered at the country level. All specifications include coun-
try fixed effects and controls for gender, age, job area, tenure in the bank, and salary band. Performance rates employees 1–4 
for the extent to which they meet the expectations of their current role. Values rates employees 1–4 for whether they act with 
integrity, are dependable, are open to different ideas, and are connected to customers. Client screening is the answer to the 
question “Where I work, people are confident talking to customers about our Customer Due Diligence/Know Your Customer 
(CDD/KYC) requirements.” This was answered on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 5 being “strongly 
agree.” Frontline (back-office) employees are those who answered yes (no) to: “Do you have regular contact with customers 
outside of BANKNAME as part of your day to day role.”
III. Conclusion
We have introduced the concept of altruistic 
capital as an asset that facilitates altruistic acts 
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Figure 2. The 2008 Financial Crisis and Returns to Altruistic Effort
Notes: Changes in unemployment are from Stevenson and Wolfers (2011). Conditional social impact/worth are the residuals 
of a regression of impact/worth on all controls except country dummies, averaged at the country level. The bubbles are pro-
portional to the sample in each country and labelled with the country’s region. The regression is estimated at the country level.
and that can be shaped by policies. We have 
shown descriptive evidence that employees in 
a global bank face different returns to altruis-
tic effort, with wide variation across jobs and 
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countries; in particular, returns are lower in 
countries that were more severely hit by the 
financial crisis. Higher returns are associated 
with more prosocial behaviors in the work-
place. The fact that returns can be shaped by 
external events opens the possibility that an 
intervention that increases the returns to altru-
istic capital triggers a virtuous circle that leads 
to prosocial behavior and the accumulation of 
more altruistic capital. It also opens up a dif-
ferent way to look at altruism within organi-
zations. With fixed preferences the stock of 
altruism in the economy is fixed and under-
standing altruism in organizations is a matter 
of understanding the sorting of individuals with 
different preferences into different organiza-
tions. With accumulable altruistic capital, firms 
can provide incentives for its accumulation. In 
general, more research is needed into whether 
and how altruistic capital can aggregate and 
provide value within an organization, and how 
it can be leveraged or depleted by organiza-
tional policies and regulation.
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